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A wide range of potentially useful data are available for election forecasting: the results of
previous elections, a multitude of preelection polls, and predictors such as measures of
national and statewide economic performance. How accurate are different forecasts? We
estimate predictive uncertainty via analysis of data collected from past elections (actual
outcomes, preelection polls, and model estimates). With these estimated uncertainties, we
use Bayesian inference to integrate the various sources of data to form posterior distributions
forthestateandnationaltwo-partyDemocraticvotesharesforthe2008election.Ourkeyidea
istoseparatelyforecastthenationalpopularvotesharesandtherelativepositionsofthestates.
More generally, such an approach could be applied to study changes in public opinion and
other phenomena with wide national swings and fairly stable spatial distributions relative to
the national average.
1 Introduction
Research tells us that national elections are predictable from fundamentals (e.g.,
Rosenstone 1983; Campbell 1992; Gelman and King 1993; Erikson and Sigman 2008;
Hibbs 2008), but this does not stop political scientists, let alone journalists, from obses-
sively tracking swings in the polls. The next level of sophistication—afforded us by the
combination of ubiquitous telephone polling and internet dissemination of results—is to
track the trends in state polls, a practice that was led in 2004 by Republican leaning real-
clearpolitics.com and in 2008 at the Web sites: election.princeton.edu (maintained by
biology professor Sam Wang (2008) and ﬁvethirtyeight.com (maintained by Democrat
and professional baseball statistician Nate Silver (2008).
Presidential elections are decided in swing states, and so it makes sense to look at state
polls. On the other hand, the relative positions of the states are highly predictable from
previous elections. So what is to be done? Is there a point of balance between the frenzy
of daily or weekly polling on the one hand, and the supine acceptance of forecasts on the
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 other? The answer is yes, a Bayesian analysis can do partial pooling between these
extremes. We use historical election results by state and campaign-season polls from
2000 to 2004 to estimate the appropriate weighting to use when combining surveys
and forecasts in the 2008 campaign.
The year leading up to a presidential election is full of polls and speculation, necessi-
tating a study of the measure of uncertainty surrounding predictions. Given the true pro-
portion who intend to vote for a candidate, one can easily compute the variance in poll
results based on the size of the sample. However, here, we wish to compute the forecast
uncertainty given the poll results of each state at some point before the election. To do this,
we need notonly thevariance ofa sample proportionbutalso anestimate for howmuchthe
true proportion varies in the months before the election and a prior distribution for state-
level voting patterns. We base our prior distribution on the 2004 election results and use
these to improve our estimates and to serve as a measure of comparison for the predictive
strength of preelection polls.
We use as an example the polls conducted in February 2008 by SurveyUSA (2008),
which sampled nearly 600 voters in each state, asking the questions, ‘‘If there were an
election for President of the United States today, and the only two names on the ballot
were Republican John McCain and Democrat Hillary Clinton, who would you vote
for?’’ and ‘‘What if it was John McCain against Democrat Barack Obama?’’ The polls
were conducted over the phone using the voice of a professional announcer, with house-
holds randomly selected using random digit dialing (Survey Sampling International 2008).
Each response was classiﬁed as one of the two candidates or undecided. For each state, the
undecidedcategoryconsistedof5%–14%ofthosepolled,andthesepeopleaswellasthird-
party supporters were excluded from our analysis. Likewise, for previous election results,
we restrict the population to those who supported either the Democrat or the Republican.
This paper merges prior data (the 2004 election results) and the poll data described
above to give posterior distributions for the position of each state relative to the national
popular vote. For the national popular vote, we use a prior determined by Douglas Hibbs’s
‘‘bread and peace model’’ (Hibbs 2008) and again merge with our SurveyUSA poll data.
In Sections 2 and 3, we ascertain the strength of each source of data in predicting the
election. Section 2 contains an analysis of the use of past election results in predicting
future election results, ultimately resulting in an estimate for the variance of the 2008
relative state positions given the 2004 election results. Section 3 contains an analysis
of the strength of preelection polls in predicting election results, giving measures of both
poll variability and variability due to time before the election. Section 4 brings the sources
together with a full Bayesian analysis, fusing prior data with poll data to create posterior
distributions. All analyses and the ﬁrst draft of Sections 1–4 were completed prior with the
election (by November 2, 2008, to be speciﬁc). Section 5 includes a retrospective evalu-
ation of our forecast, written shortly after the election to allow for comparison with the
election results.
Our goal is not to estimate public opinion at any particular point in time but to fore-
cast public opinion. Although methods such as poll aggregation may work well for es-
timating current opinion, models such as the Bayesian one provided here are more robust
to preelection ﬂuctuations. Our method integrates estimates not speciﬁc to a certain point
in time with current poll estimates, as we believe the combination to be more powerful
than either alone for estimating future election results. Here, we use Douglas Hibbs’s
model and past election results to supplement current polling data, but our general method
could be applied with any relatively stable national or state information extraneous to
polling data.
2 Kari Lock and Andrew Gelman
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 Although much effort is spent for forecasting the national vote, often interest is in the
relative state positions. This paper is not meant to provide the best method for forecasting
the national vote but to provide a forecasting method that separates the national vote and
the state positions relative to the national vote. This separation allows us to better incor-
porate historical data on state positions with polling data, adding valuable information to
individual state forecasts.
Moregenerally,anapproachsuchasdescribed herecouldbeappliedtostudychangesin
public opinion and other phenomena with wide national swings and fairly stable spatial
distributionsrelativetothenationalaverage.Forexample,LaxandPhillips(2009)compare
state-level policies and attitudes on several gay rights questions in the period from 1994
through 2006. The relative rankings of the states on gay rights were fairly stable during
a period of great change nationally. In trying to estimate current attitudes within states (or,
moregenerally,withinsubsetsofthepopulation),itmakessensetodecomposenationaland
local variation. We illustrate in the present article with forecasts of the 2008 election.
2 Past Election Results
The political positions of the states are consistent in the short term from year to year; for
example, New York has strongly favored the Democrats in recent decades, Utah has been
consistently Republican, and Ohio has been in the middle. We begin our analysis by quan-
tifying the ability to predict a state outcome in a future election using the results of past
elections. We do this using the presidential elections of 1976–2004. We chose not to
goback beyond1976sincestate results correlate strongly (.79< r<.95) for adjacent elec-
tionsafter1972,whereasthecorrelationbetweenthe1972andthe1976electionsisonly.11.
Figure1showsstrongcorrelations inthe Democratic shareofthevoteineach state from
one presidential election to the next. But in many cases, the proportion for the Democrat is
uniformly higher or lower than would have been predicted by the previous election. For
example, states had much higher proportions for Clinton in 1992 than for Dukakis in 1988
and much lower proportions for Gore in 2000 than for Clinton in 1996. This does not in-
dicate a change in states’relativepartisanship butrather avarying nationwide popularity of
Fig. 1 State results from one presidential election to the next in each case showing the Democratic
candidates’ share of the two-party vote in each state. The 2008 results are shown here, but this
information was not used or available at the time of analysis.
3 State Polls and Election Forecasts
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 the Democratic candidate from election to election. Obama’s vote share in a state may
differ from Kerry’s, but thevote for Kerry in any given state compared with the nationwide
vote seems to be indicative of Obama’s vote in that state compared with nationwide. For
this reason, we look at the relative state positions, the difference between the proportion
voting Democratic in each state and the national proportion voting Democratic.
We tried various models using past elections to predict future elections but found that
not much was gained by using data from elections prior to the most recent election. We
imagine that with careful adjustment for economic and political trends, there is useful in-
formation from earlier presidential races (as well as data from other elections), but in this
paper, we keep things simple: In our analysis of 2008, we ignore election data before 2004
andsimplyconsidertheproportionofvotersineachstatechoosing JohnKerryoverGeorge
W. Bush in the 2004 election.
After centering around the national vote (Kerry’s share of the two-party votewas 48.8%
so our prior data become, for each state, the proportion voting for Kerry minus .488), our
only adjustment is a home-state correction. We attribute 6% (as determined via analysis of
past elections; see Campbell 1992; Gelman and King 1993) of the vote for Bush and Kerry
in Texas and Massachusetts, respectively, to a home-state advantage, and we add that same
amount in the forecast for McCain in Arizona and Clinton in New York or Obama in
Illinois. Furtherimprovementshould be possiblewith careful modeling (or the sort of care-
ful empiricism that political professionals do), but it would not alter our basic point that
national and statewide swings can be modeled separately.
Todeterminethestrengthofourpriordata,weneedtoknowhowmuchthesestaterelative
positionsvaryfromelectiontoelection.Forthis,weneeddatafromseveralelections.Letds,y
betherelativepositionforstatesinyeary.Weﬁrstestimatevar(ds,2008jds,2004)foreachstate
by ð1=7Þ
P7
i51
 
ds;yi112ds;yi
 2, where~ y5 ð1976;...;2004Þ. With only seven data points
for each state, however, these estimatescould be unreliable. We could get around this prob-
lem by assuming a common variance estimate for all states, but rather than forcing either
1 common estimate or 50 individual estimates, we use shrinkage estimation (also called
partialpooling).Exactlyhowmuchtopulleachestimatetothecommonmeanisdetermined
viaahierarchicalmodel,whichweﬁtinRusinglmer(Bates2005)andisultimatelybasedon
comparisons of within-state and between-state variability. Before pooling, the estimates of
SDforeachstaterangefrom0.012to0.073,withcompletepoolingthecommonestimateis
0.037 and after our partial pooling the estimates range from 0.029 to 0.055.
From the normalapproximation,we canexpectthe difference in2008tofallwithin0.06
of the 2004 state difference for the most consistent states and up to 0.11 away for the least
consistent states.
3 Preelection Polls
How much can we learn from February polls of 600 voters in each state? If we ignore that
the polls were conducted so early in the year, it appears we can learn quite a lot. Due
to sampling variability alone, we would expect the true proportion who would vote Dem-
ocratic in each state to be within 0.04 of the sample proportion
 
SD5
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
pð12pÞ=n
p
 
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
0:5   0:5=600
p
50:02
 
. A SD of 0.02 would make a poll of this size
more informative than the 2004 election. Using Monte Carlo techniques, one could sim-
ulate many potential ‘‘true’’ proportions for each state, and so many potential popular or
electoral college results, as done in Erikson and Sigman (2008). However, this would de-
pict voter preferences in February. To get a true measure of variability, we need to consider
4 Kari Lock and Andrew Gelman
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 not only sampling variability and other survey issues but also uncertainty about opinion
shifts between then and Election Day (Strauss 2007).
We estimate the national-level variance in vote intention during the months before the
election using the results of Gallup polls in the presidential election years from 1952
through 2004. The sample size for the Gallup polls averaged 1500 each. Let pt denote
the true national proportion who intended to vote for the Democratic candidate, t months
before the election, ˆ pt denote our estimate of pt from a preelection poll, and p0 denote the
two-partyDemocraticvoteshareintheactualelection.Ideally,wewouldlikevar
 
ˆ pt
   p0
 
as
a function of both the poll sample size, n, and the number of months before the election the
poll was conducted, t. Decomposing the variance conditionally yields:
varð ˆ ptjp0Þ5Eðvarðˆ ptjptÞjp0Þ1varðEðˆ ptjptÞjp0Þ
5E
 
ptð12ptÞ
n
       p0
 
1varðptjp0Þ
5
E
 
pt
   p0
 
2E
 
p2
t
   p0
 
n
1varðptjp0Þ
5
p0ð12p0Þ
n
1
 
n21
n
 
varðptjp0Þ
 
p0ð12p0Þ
n
1varðptjp0Þ: ð1Þ
The second term in this expression, var(ptjp0), represents uncertainty in the underlying
true proportion who would vote Democratic t months before the election, and it is not
affected by the quality or quantity of polls conducted.
From equation (1), var
 
pt
   p0
 
5var
 
ˆ pt
   p0
 
2p0
 
12p0
  
n; and so, it can be estimated
by empirically calculating var
 
ˆ pt
   p0
 
and subtracting off the expected sampling variabil-
ity.
1 Let ˆ pt;i and nt,i denote estimated proportion and sample size, respectively, for the ith
pollinagivenmonth,andletNtbethenumberofpollswehavetmonthsbeforetheelection
(from Gallup polls 1952–2004). We then estimate var(ptjp0)b y
c varðptjp0Þ5
PNt
i51
h 
ˆ pt;i2p0
 22
p0ð12p0Þ
nt;i
i
Nt
: ð2Þ
The variances estimated in this fashion for each month are displayed in Fig. 2a along
with a line ﬁtted by weighted least squares. (SEs are displayed for each point, with larger
SEs in months with less historical polling data available.) The linear trend appears to ﬁt
reasonably well, and the individual variance estimates are noisy enough that it would be
difﬁcult to ﬁt a more elaborate curve. We set the intercept to be 0, assuming the popular
vote in November should match that of the election and ignoring issues such as voter turn-
out.
2This modelgives c var
 
pt
   p0
 
50:0008t, with a SE of0.00013on the slope,suggesting
that the variance in the underlying popular vote increases by 0.0008 each additional month
1The p(1 2 p)/nvariance estimate is in practice an underestimate of survey error, given clustering, weighting, and
other issues that depart from simple random sampling. A more elaborate analysis—using individual respondent
data instead of just state averages—could account for these complexities using poststratiﬁcation.
2When we remove the zero-intercept constraint, the estimated intercepts were low and not statistically signiﬁ-
cantly different from zero.
5 State Polls and Election Forecasts
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 before the election. Extrapolating to February yields c SD
 
pfeb
   p0
 
50:086, which is
enough higher than forecast uncertainties to imply that February polls contain almost
no information about the candidates’ national vote shares on Election Day.
We now repeat the above calculations, this time to estimate the variance of the relative
positions of the states during the months before the election. We do this using the National
Annenberg Election Survey, a large rolling cross-section poll conducted in 2000 and 2004
by the Annenberg Public Policy Center (2008) at the University of Pennsylvania. Again
restricting our analysis only to those who say that they would vote for the Democrat or the
Republican, we have 43,373 people polled in 2000 and 52,825 in 2004.
Now we want var
  ˆ ds;t
   d0
 
as a function of n and t, where ds,t is the relative position,
t months before the election, of state s. We follow the same logic as with the popular vote,
except now instead of averagingover multipleyears worth of preelection polling data, with
only 2 years to work with we have to average over the states. We average over all states,
assuming a common variance across states. We tried computing separate estimates for
small and large states, or for Democratic, Republican, and battleground states, but the
differences in estimated variances between these different sorts of states were small
andnotstatisticallysigniﬁcant.Duetothesamplesizes inmanystates,wechoseacommon
estimate rather than noisier alternatives. For each state in each month, sample sizes range
from 0 to 844, butwith 42% havingless than 30 people polled. Sample sizes this small lead
to unreliable estimates, so we tweak equation (2) slightly and take a weighted average,
weighting by sample size. We thus estimate var(ds,tjd0)b y
c varðds;tjps;0Þ5
P
y2f2000;2004g
P50
s51 ns;y;t
h  ˆ ds;y;t 2 ds;y;0
 2
2
ps;y;0ð12ps;y;0Þ
ns;y;t
i
P
y2f2000;2004g
P50
s51 ns;y;t
: ð3Þ
This is not quite as straightforward as the calculation for equation (2) becausewe do not
observe the national opinion at time t so cannot actually observe ˆ ds;t (we only have ˆ ps;t). To
get around this, we estimate the national popular vote each month before the elections of
2000 and 2004 using both the Annenberg state polls and the Gallup poll data. In practice,
the abundance of large national polls should give a good estimate of the national opinion at
any point in time. We use these estimates to calculate each ˆ ds;t, which then allows us to
Fig. 2 (a) Estimated variances of the popular vote in each month given the popular vote in the
election. (b) Estimated variances of the relativeposition ofeach state in each month given the relative
position of the state in the election. Error bars represent ±1 SE.
6 Kari Lock and Andrew Gelman
 
b
y
 
o
n
 
A
p
r
i
l
 
6
,
 
2
0
1
0
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
p
a
n
.
o
x
f
o
r
d
j
o
u
r
n
a
l
s
.
o
r
g
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
 
f
r
o
m
 compute equation (3) for each month. The estimated variances are shown in Fig. 2b.
A weighted linear regression on these data points, again with intercept 0, gives the equa-
tion c var
 
ds;t
   ds;0
 
50:0002t, with a slope SE of 0.00005. This estimates
c SD
 
ds;feb
   ds;0
 
50:041, about half the SD of the national mean.
4 Posterior Distributions
With the variance estimates derived in Sections 2 and 3, we are all set to go forth with the
full Bayesian analysis. We ﬁrst look only at the relative positions of the states and mo-
mentarily ignore the national popular vote. Our poll and prior distributions can be repre-
sented as follows:
Poll : ˆ ds;tjds;0   N
 
ds;0;
ps;0
 
12ps;0
 
ns;t
1varðds;tjds;0Þ
 
: ð4Þ
Prior : ds;0
   ds;2004   N
 
ds;2004;var
 
ds;0
   ds;2004
  
: ð5Þ
Here, ds,0 is equivalent to the notation ds,2008 used in Section 2; both refer to the relative
position of state s at the time of the 2008 election.
Model (4) gives the distribution of a state poll conducted t months before the election
(relative to the national opinion at that time), given that state’s ultimate relative position at
the time of the election. The poll variance has a component based on the poll sample size
and a component based on time before the election. In Section 3, we estimated thevariance
due to time before the election to be var(ds,tjds,0)   0.0002t. This estimate was calculated
by using the Annenberg state polls from the 2000 and 2004 elections. Normality is justiﬁed
by the large sample size of each poll.
The prior gives a distribution for the state relative positions in the 2008 election given
each state’s relative position in the 2004 election. The prior variance, var(ds,0jds,2004), is
estimated in Section 2 using the results of past elections. Estimated variances range from
0.029
2 to 0.056
2, differing by state. Normality for the prior distribution is justiﬁed by the
general lack of outliers in state election returns (an assumption that did not quite hold in
2008, as Hawaii was an outlier).
Combining these distributions will provide our quantity of interest, a posterior distri-
bution for the true state relative positions at the time of the election, given poll data and the
2004 election results. With the normal–normal mixture model, we weight by information,
the reciprocal of variance. Our posterior takes the form:
ds;0j ˆ ds;t;ds;2004   N
  1
varð ˆ ds;tjds;0Þ
ˆ ds;r1 1
varðds;0jds;2004Þds;2004
1
varð ˆ ds;tjds;0Þ1 1
varðds;0jds;2004Þ
;
1
1
varð ˆ ds;tjds;0Þ1 1
varðds;0jds;2004Þ
!
: ð6Þ
We illustrate with the February SurveyUSA state polls described in Section 1. We ﬁrst
calculate ˆ ds;feb for each state. We do not know the popular vote in February so cannot
compute these exactly but can get a pretty close estimate given that we have a sample
size exceeding 500 in each state. In Section 3, we estimated var(ds,febjds,0)   0.041
2,
so from equation (4), we get the poll distribution as follows:
ˆ ds;febjds;0   N
 
ds;0;
ps;0
 
12ps;0
 
ns;feb
1 0:0412
 
: ð7Þ
7 State Polls and Election Forecasts
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 The sample sizes range from 500 to 600, leading to SDs ranging from 0.045 to 0.047.
(Ourmodelassumesthat the state poll givesan unbiasedestimate of the true opinion at that
date.Theanalysisbecomesmoredifﬁcultif,e.g.,pollstersareperformingtheirownBayesian
adjustments and shrinking down outliers before reporting their survey numbers.)
For most states, the poll SD (0.045–0.047) is higher than the prior SD (0.029–0.056).
This means that most posteriors will place more weight on the estimates based on the 2004
election results than on the February poll estimates. For a typical state, equation (6)
simpliﬁes to something like
ds;0
    ˆ ds;feb;ds;2004   N
 
0:4 ˆ ds;feb 1 0:6ds;2004;0:032 
; ð8Þ
with the weight on the poll estimate ranging from 0.29 to 0.59 and the SDs ranging from
0.025 to 0.036. States with higher prior variances place more weight on the polls and have
higher posterior SDs. Figure 3 shows the posterior predictions for the relative positions of
the states for both Clinton and Obama. (The poll was conducted before the Democratic
candidate was chosen, and our prior applies to any Democratic candidate.) In retrospect
(and, perhaps, evenbefore the election), the estimatesare notperfect—for example,should
Texas really have been viewed as close to a toss-up state for Obama?—and such discrep-
ancies should motivate model improvement. (From a Bayesian perspective, if you produce
an estimate using correct procedures but it still looks ‘‘wrong,’’ that means you have
additional information that has not yet been included in the model as prior or data.)
We now move on to creating a posterior for the national popular vote. We construct our
prior based on the estimate and predictiveSD from Hibbs (2008), who predicts the national
two-party Democratic vote share based only on two factors: weighted-average growth of
per capita real personal disposable income over the previous term (with the weighting es-
timated based on past election results) and cumulative U.S. military fatalities owing to
unprovoked hostile deployments of American armed forces in foreign conﬂicts. To deter-
minethevariance inthe success ofthis model,we look at its predictions for the previous 14
elections (1952–2004). The sample SD of (predicted 2 actual) is 0.021 (quite accurate for
only two predictors and no polling information!). Shortly before the election, Hibbs
predicted that Obama would get 53.75% of the two-party vote.
Thus, for the national popular vote, we have the following:
Poll : ˆ ptjp0   N
 
p0;
p0ð12p0Þ
nt
1varðptjp0Þ
 
: ð9Þ
Prior : p0   N
 
0:5375;0:0212 
: ð10Þ
Posterior : p0jˆ pt   N
 
1
varðˆ ptjp0Þˆ pt1 1
0:02120:5375
1
varðˆ ptjp0Þ1 1
0:0212
;
1
1
varðˆ ptjp0Þ1 1
0:0212
!
: ð11Þ
With our February poll data, we get the estimated popular vote by weighting the sample
poll proportion voting Democratic in each state by the number of voters in that state in the
2004 election. This gave a national estimate of 51.44% for Obama. From Section 3,
var
 
ˆ pfeb
   p0
 
5p0
 
12p0
  
n 1 0:0862  
 
0:51   0:49
  
27000 1 0:0862, giving a SD
of 8.6 percentage points. This variance may not be entirely accurate because the variance
was estimated in Section 3 using polls of a nationwide sample rather than a sample within
each state, but we did not have sufﬁcient state-level data from enough past elections to
provide a better estimate. This estimate (0.086) is much larger than the SD associated with
8 Kari Lock and Andrew Gelman
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 our prior (0.021), so the posterior will be strongly weighted toward Hibbs’s estimate.
Substituting these numbers into equations (9)–(11) yields,
Poll : ˆ pfeb
   p0   N
 
p0;0:0862 
: ð12Þ
Prior : p0   N
 
0:5375;0:0212 
: ð13Þ
Posterior : p0jˆ pfeb   N
 
0:06ˆ pfeb10:94ˆ pHibbs;
1
1
0:08621 1
0:0212
!
  Nð0:536;0:0202Þ: ð14Þ
Although the weight on our February poll data is relatively low (0.06 for the popular
vote and about 0.4 for the state relative positions), if the same polls had been conducted in
Fig. 3 95% posterior intervals for the relative position of each state, alongside prior and poll point
estimates. The left column gives the probability of each state going Democratic (which incorporates
the posterior for the national popular vote). States are ordered by 2004 Democratic vote share.
9 State Polls and Election Forecasts
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 October, the weight on the poll estimates would shift to 0.35 for the popular vote and
around 0.9 for the state relative positions. The time the poll is conducted is key for
determining the appropriate weights to place on the prior and the poll and so for creating
the posterior distributions.
Now that we have posterior distributions for both the national popular vote and each
state’s position relative to this, we can simply add them together to get posterior distri-
butions for the proportion voting Democratic in each state. To create a posterior distribu-
tion for Obama’s electoral college vote share, we simulate 100,000 elections, each time
randomly drawing ﬁrst a national popular vote from equation (14), and then simulating
each state outcome by adding a draw from equation (8) to the simulated popular vote.
The simulated electoral vote outcomes are shown in Fig. 4(a) and have a posterior mean
of 353 and SD of 28. Of the 100,000 simulated elections, Obama won 99,870.
5 Discussion
5.1 Retrospective Evaluation of Our Forecast
Our predictions were based on the SurveyUSA February poll data (for both the relative
state positions and the popular vote estimate), the 2004 election results (for the relative
state positions), and Hibbs’s October, 2008, forecast of the popular vote. Our analysis
and the ﬁrst draft of this paper up to this point were completed before the election,
and we added the present paragraph just after the election, allowing us to compare our
posterior estimates with the actual election results. The actual two-party popular vote
for Obama was 53.7%, very close to our posterior predictive mean of 53.6%. (Given
our SE, we do not claim any special magic in our method; we just happened to get lucky
that it was so close.)
At thenationallevel, ourforecastisbarelydistinguishablefromthatofHibbsor,for that
matter, many other political science forecasts based on ‘‘the fundamentals’’ (see Wlezien
and Erikson 2007). Where we go further is by using state-level information to get a state-
level forecast. The current state of the art in political journalism is poll aggregation, which
Fig. 4 (a) Posterior distribution for Obama’s electoral college vote share. Anything >270 indicates
anObamavictory.(b)ActualelectionresultsplottedagainstourpredictionoftheDemocraticshareof
the two-party vote in each state.
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 is ﬁne for tracking current opinion butdoes not make the best use of the information for the
purpose of state-to-state forecasting.
Figure 4(b) shows the actual Democratic vote share for each state compared with
our predictions. We came quite close for most states, but we tended to overestimate
Obama’s popularity in Republican states and underestimate in Democratic states (a
problem that also was present in preelection poll aggregations; see ﬁgure A15 of
Gelman et al. 2009). The correlation between our predicted values and actual
values is 0.96, and the root mean square error (RMSE) of our estimates is ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ ﬃ  
1
.
50
 P50
s51
 
ps;predicted2ps;actual
 2
r
50:031. The RMSE for ﬁvethirtyeight.com’s
estimates, which use polls leading up the election, is 0.025. It is not surprising
that you get closer to the truth using preelection polls right before the election, but
it is remarkable that we can do so well without using any polling data collected beyond
February.
Althoughtheaccuracyofourpredictionsisimportant,wealsocareaboutthecalibration
of our variance estimates, as every prediction needs an accompanying degree of uncer-
tainty. The RMSE for our estimated state relative positions is 0.031, whereas our posterior
SDs range from 0.025 to 0.036, helping to improve the credibility of our variance esti-
mates. The true position of each state falls within our 95% posterior intervals for 49 of
the 50 states (we underestimated Hawaii), giving 98% coverage. For the relative state posi-
tions, we have 94% coverage, missing Hawaii, Arkansas, and Indiana. (Some of this has to
be attributable to luck—the state estimates are correlated, and a large national swing could
easily introduce a higher state-by-state error rate.)
5.2 The Fundamental Contradiction of Up-to-the-minute Poll Aggregation
Pollscanbeaggregated togetasnapshot(or movingaverage) ofpublic opinion,at thestate
or national level, but, as Wang (2008) has pointed out, such a snapshot is not the same as
a forecast. For one example, presidential horse-race polls predictably jump during the par-
ties’summer nominating conventions, but only a naive reader of the news would think that
such jumps represent real increases in the probability of a candidate winning.
Trackingpublic opinion isaworthy goal inits ownright,butif youare trying to forecast
the presidential election, our message from this paper is that frequent polling provides very
little information. Thus, as poll aggregation sites such as the Princeton Election Consor-
tium, RealClearPolitics, FiveThirtyEight become more and more sophisticated at election
forecasting, they will ultimately provide less and less in the way of relevant updates for
their news-hungry consumers. This is not a bad thing—as with baseball statistics, the lead-
ing political statistics Web sites have already been moving from raw numbers and simple
summaries toward more analytical modeling—and we hope that the present article will do
its part to shift political reporting toward information for the general voter and analysis for
the political junkies rather than horse-race summaries for both.
5.3 Conclusions
Thispaperhasthegoalofdeterminingthestrengthofpastelectionsandofpreelectionpolls
in predicting a future election and combining these sources to forecast the election. We
found that to predict the current election using the results of the most recent election is
a good predictor of the way each state votes compared with the nation, but not necessarily
of the national vote.
11 State Polls and Election Forecasts
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 Hence, past election data are best used with a current estimate of the popular vote (such
as can be obtained from polls or from forecasts that use economic and other information).
Thus, our key contribution here is to separate the national forecast (on which much effort
hasbeen expendedby manyresearchers) from the relativepositions of the states (for which
pastelections andcurrent pollscanbecombined tomakeinferences). Preelectionpolls,not
surprisingly, are more reliable as they get closer to the election. Our advance with this
analysis is quantiﬁcation of this trend. Further work could be done (following Rosenstone
1983; Campbell 1992, and many others) in incorporating additional state-level economic
and political information, whereas working within our framework that separates the na-
tional swing from relative movement among states. And we believe that these ideas would
be helpful in studying state-level public opinion and, moregenerally, anyphenomenon that
admits separate aggregate and relative forecasts.
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